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In this paper, I critically examine Cécile Laborde’s Liberalism’s Religion 
and argue that her approach to religious exemptions faces signifi cant 
diffi culties. I fi rst highlight some methodological disagreements with 
Laborde’s theory. I raise concerns about her theory’s ‘two-pronged’ struc-
ture being too narrow. Moreover, Laborde’s ‘disaggregation approach’ 
promises a context-sensitive, bottom-up theory of exemptions which ex-
amines exemption claims on a case-by-case basis, but instead offers a 
top-down theory that provides an idealized explanation for potentially 
all religious exemption cases. I argue that a non-ideal approach which 
does not offer an overarching explanation of exemptions is preferable 
to Laborde’s. Next, I discuss further problems with Laborde’s theory, 
which concern her assumption that if there is something ‘ethically sa-
lient’ about religious practices, it must be located at the personal level. 
Laborde claims that if we want to ascertain the ethical salience of a prac-
tice, we must focus on the relationship between the person and her com-
mitments. But this individualistic focus cannot always account for why 
we want to accommodate religious practices. Such practices, I claim, are 
sometimes accommodated not on an individual, but on a group-based 
rationale. Finally, I address Laborde’s dismissal of the analogy between 
religion and disability. Laborde’s view regarding disabilities and the 
stated analogy is unsatisfactory in two respects: it is based on the medi-
cal model of disability and it overlooks the role of the environment in 
turning physical impairments into disabilities.
Keywords: Liberalism and religion, religious accommodation, reli-
gious exemptions, multiculturalism, disability accommodation.
1. Introduction
The relationship between religion and politics has fascinated political 
and legal theorists for a long time. Since most liberals hold the ideal 
of state neutrality in high regard, special accommodation of religion in 
56 M. Zala, Laborde’s Liberalism’s Religion
law is not easily justifi ed. One question that liberals are particularly 
interested in is whether exempting religious practices from generally 
applicable laws is justifi able without giving religions unjust privilege. 
The uneasiness with religious accommodation is not diffi cult to under-
stand: although religion’s prominent role in society has weakened, reli-
gious exemptions permit members of certain religious groups freedoms 
that non-members do not enjoy (cf. Levy 1997: 28). This is indeed puz-
zling for liberals who believe the state should not favor one conception 
of the good over others.
In her new book, Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde offers a novel 
framework for reconsidering the question of religious exemptions.1 Her 
alternative view to earlier, mainstream approaches that try to analo-
gize religion with other ‘conceptions of the good’ is the ‘disaggregation 
approach,’ a concept that she adopts from the work of James Nickel 
(see Laborde 2015: 594). In Laborde’s understanding, “[t]he starting 
point of the disaggregation strategy is to suggest that different parts of 
the law should capture different dimensions of religion for the protec-
tion of different normative values” (Laborde 2015: 594). The view posits 
that we should not look at religion through a single lens. Rather, we 
ought to analyze what religion is in the given context and what values 
are at stake. Thus, throughout the book, Laborde devotes great effort 
into the examination of what ‘religion’ in the given context is, and what 
kind of normative response it prompts.
I am convinced that Liberalism’s Religion will become an instant 
classic. But despite its elegance, ingenuity and importance, I will ar-
gue in this paper that Laborde’s approach to religious exemptions faces 
serious diffi culties. I will contrast her approach with my earlier work 
that I believe provides more convincing solutions to the highlighted 
challenges.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a brief outline 
of Laborde’s theory of exemptions. The three subsections of Section 2 
fl esh out my three distinctive disagreements with Laborde’s approach. 
The fi nal section concludes.
2. Laborde’s theory of religious exemptions
In Liberalism’s Religion, Laborde rejects three promising liberal strat-
egies for solving the puzzle of religious exemptions—dissolving reli-
gion, mainstreaming religion and narrowing religion. The strategy of 
‘dissolving religion’ acknowledges that it is indeed unjustifi ed to ex-
empt religious practices from the requirements of generally applicable 
laws. This is Ronald Dworkin’s position, which holds that religion and 
religious freedom are not themselves special (2013). Thus, Dworkin’s 
answer to what Laborde calls religion’s ‘ethical salience problem’, i.e. 
1 The other big question her book addresses, which I do not discuss in this paper, 
is religious establishment.
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the evaluation of the ethical relevance of “different kinds of beliefs, 
practices, and identities” (Laborde 2017: 41) is that religious belief is 
just one type of comparable non-religious commitments, worldviews, 
and (even seemingly mundane) preferences (Laborde 2017: 44). This is 
why Laborde labels Dworkin’s stance on religion as ‘dissolution’:
[Dworkin’s strategy] proposes to broaden religion into a maximally inclu-
sive category that comprises preferences, commitments, identities, beliefs, 
worldviews, and so forth. Religion is not so much analogized with them as 
dissolved into them. This means that neither religion nor the more inclusive 
category it falls under needs to be defi ned precisely, because their bound-
aries and scope are irrelevant for the purpose of egalitarian treatment. 
Logically, therefore, because there is no specifi c category that displays iden-
tifi able features that would justify differential treatment, there is no justifi -
cation for exemptions from the law. (Laborde 2017: 44)
Laborde rejects Dworkin’s view because she believes it suffers from 
“hidden tensions” and “internal contradictions” (Laborde 2017: 46; cf. 
Laborde 2014a). Dworkin maintains that religion is not uniquely spe-
cial, but just one possible conception of the good; as such, Dworkin be-
lieves religion is not ethically salient at all, that is, religion does not de-
serve special ethical consideration. But Laborde shows that sometimes 
Dworkin does acknowledge that religion is ethically salient, when he 
suggests that in some cases it is wrongful for the state to indirectly 
burden religious individuals’ “sacred duties” (Laborde 2017: 47). But 
if this is the case, then religious practice is ethically salient. Dworkin, 
however, does not offer the grounds for distinguishing between impor-
tant practices motivated by sacred duties and unimportant practices 
(Laborde 2017: 48–9).
The other liberal egalitarian strategy that Laborde rejects is the 
one that she labels the “mainstreaming strategy” (Laborde 2017: 50–
61), based on the view of Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager 
(2007). Eisgruber and Sager hold that religious believers should enjoy 
equal, but not special freedom. Religion is special, but not uniquely so; 
concerns of free exercise of religion are on a par with equally important 
and protection-worthy interests, such as familial commitments or the 
needs of the disabled (Laborde 2017: 52). Thus, Eisgruber and Sager 
believe that providing religious exemptions is justifi ed by a concern for 
antidiscrimination.
But which feature of religion is ethically salient for egalitarian and 
antidiscrimination purposes? One feature that Eisgruber and Sager 
highlight is the vulnerability of religious minorities to hostile and un-
just treatment of the majority. Their main example of majority neglect 
is the Employment Division v. Smith case, in which two Native Ameri-
cans were denied unemployment benefi ts because they were fi red for 
ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug used for Native American ritu-
als.2 But because a similar exemption was provided to a religious ma-
2 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990).
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jority group, namely, the exemption for ceremonial wine at Christian 
masses in Oregon, not exempting Native Americans is discriminatory 
in their view (Eisgruber and Sager 2007: 92; Laborde 2017: 54). In ad-
dition, Eisgruber and Sager try to explain why religion is morally sa-
lient for exemption: religious commitments are “deep”, similarly to oth-
er serious protection-worthy commitments like familial commitments 
and disability-related needs (Laborde 2017: 55).
While sympathetic to Eisgruber and Sager’s emphasis on differen-
tial treatment for religious majorities and religious minorities, Laborde 
rejects their view because she does not agree with analogizing reli-
gion with disability. Religious practices are fundamentally different, 
Laborde holds, because disability is by and large a negative state of the 
person that she wants to get rid of, whereas a religious practice is not 
considered a detriment that calls for compensation (Laborde 2017: 56).3
The third mainstream approach to religious exemptions is the view 
of Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (2011), which Laborde labels 
the “narrowing strategy” (Laborde 2017: 61). In Laborde’s view, Ma-
clure and Taylor reduce the ethical salience of religion to conscientious 
duties (Laborde 2017: 61). For instance, they analogize religion with 
other non-religious conscientious commitments, like pacifi sts’ rejec-
tion of military service (Maclure and Taylor 2011: 89–90). Laborde, 
however, dismisses their approach because she thinks it is too narrow: 
conscience as the ground for providing religious exemptions is not sat-
isfactory because many religious claims for exemption are much more 
practice-oriented than the ‘narrowing strategy’ suggests. She mentions 
devout Muslims and Catholics as relevant examples: if a devout Mus-
lim observes Ramadan, or a devout Christian observes Lent properly, 
then these practices are “fundamentally about exhibiting the virtues of 
the good believer, living in community with others, and shaping one’s 
daily life in accordance with the rituals of the faith” (Laborde 2017: 
66–7), rather than conscientious duties, strictly speaking.
As I mentioned earlier, Laborde’s alternative view to these main-
stream approaches is the disaggregation strategy. Armed with this 
method, Laborde aims to keep what is best in earlier theories without 
inheriting their shortcomings. Laborde dismisses Dworkin’s strategy, 
for it does not fi nd religion ethically salient. But while she fi nds Ma-
clure and Taylor’s approach too narrow, she builds on their theory by 
adopting their two-pronged theoretical structure. According to this ap-
proach, what must be established in the fi rst step is the ethical salience 
of religion, after which comes the question whether the given practice 
should be accommodated or not.
What makes religious practices ethically salient for Laborde vis-à-
vis Eisgruber and Sager and Maclure and Taylor? Despite her denial 
of the conscientious duty approach of Maclure and Taylor, Laborde be-
lieves the strongest form of ethical salience is in the neighborhood of 
3 In subsection 2.3, I examine this point in greater detail.
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conscientious duties, as she thinks that what makes religion ethically 
salient is integrity. Religious practices, according to Laborde, are re-
lated to “integrity protecting commitments”, or IPCs (Laborde 2017: 
197–217). Laborde identifi es two types of IPCs: obligation-IPCs, which 
have a scope wider than Protestant conscientious duties (because they 
refer to embodied practices on top of beliefs) and identity-IPCs, which 
may concern any religious practice connected to the believer’s deeper 
sense of the self (Laborde 2017: 197–217). Either of these two grounds 
are suffi cient for Laborde to give a pro tanto reason for accommodation.
Once the question of ethical salience is answered, the second step 
is to discover principles that inform us when IPCs should be accommo-
dated. Laborde proposes two principles for justifying exemptions: dis-
proportionate burden and majority bias (Laborde 2017: 217–38). The 
disproportionate burden principle, which aims to ensure that laws will 
“avoid disproportionately burdening certain kinds of commitments” 
(Laborde 2017: 221), has four elements: directness, severity, aim of the 
law, and cost-shifting. Directness “is measured in relation to the costs 
incurred by individuals in avoiding subjection to the law or regulation 
in the fi rst place” (Laborde 2017: 221). The more direct a burden that 
a law places on the given religious practice, the more reason we have 
for exempting it from the requirements of that law. How severely a re-
ligious practice is burdened on Laborde’s view depends on how deeply 
the practice is rooted in the believer’s perceived (i.e. subjective) obliga-
tion (Laborde 2017: 223). The aim of the law criterion observes the 
extent to which a given law is central “in promoting egalitarian justice” 
(Laborde 2017: 225). Thus, “[t]he more tightly a law promotes a goal 
of egalitarian justice, and the more it requires universal and uniform 
compliance for its effectiveness, the less it will tolerate exemptions” 
(Laborde 2017: 225). Finally, cost-shifting aims to guarantee that ex-
emptions will not cause unjust burdens to those not exempted by the 
law, but this must be balanced against the previous three consider-
ations. Laborde concludes that whether “exemptions are compatible 
with justice” depends on “if the balance of these four reasons renders 
the burden disproportionate” (Laborde 2017: 228).
Laborde’s second principle for religious exemption is majority bias. 
This principle justifi es exemptions where the background conditions 
favor a historically dominant religion (Laborde 2017: 229). This is a 
comparatively egalitarian principle that is clearly infl uenced by Eisgr-
uber and Sager. Thus, for example, the preference of Muslims to leave 
their workplaces earlier on Friday can be justifi ed on the grounds that 
the structure of the working week displays a majority (Christian) bias.
In the remainder of the paper, I will show that despite its elegance, 
Laborde’s theory faces serious challenges.
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3. The problem with Laborde’s conception 
of the ethical salience of religion
In this section, I will highlight three different problems with Laborde’s 
approach. First (subsection 2.1), I will highlight some methodological 
disagreements I have with the two-pronged structure of Laborde’s the-
ory. Second (subsection 2.2), I show her fundamentally individualistic 
formulation of ethical salience, i.e. that the ethical salience of religion 
depends solely on some personal features of the religious believer, to be 
too narrow. Finally (subsection 2.3), I show her rejection of the analogy 
between religion and disability to be unconvincing; I demonstrate this by 
looking at my argument from earlier work that establishes this analogy.
3.1 Some methodological disagreements
As we have seen above, Laborde highlights two features of religious 
practices that make them ethically salient: obligation-IPCs and iden-
tity-IPCs (while giving stronger moral weight to the former). Thus, 
Laborde’s formulation of ethical salience does not cover all religious 
practices. She bites the bullet here. Refl ecting on the view of Andrew 
Koppelman, who considers all religious activities as potentially pro-
tection-worthy even if they are only motivated by “habit, adherence to 
custom or happy religious enthusiasm,” Laborde asserts that practices 
which spring from these motivations are not eligible for accommoda-
tion (Laborde 2017: 216; cf. Koppelman 2006). Is the omission of non-
integrity-based religious practices a problem? I believe it is. This stems 
from my methodological disagreements with Laborde.
First, I fi nd the two-pronged structure of Laborde’s theory too nar-
row. I understand why she and others like Maclure and Taylor believe 
that, for accommodation, we need to explain why a given religious pref-
erence is special compared to a non-religious one: if Sikhs’ motivation 
for wearing a turban on motorcycles, which excludes the possibility of 
wearing a crash helmet, merely comes from happy religious enthusi-
asm, then it is hard to argue against Brian Barry’s former colleague, 
who assured him that “nothing matches riding a Harley-Davidson at 
full throttle down a deserted freeway, and […] a bare head is essential 
to the value of the experience” (Barry 2001: 47). Establishing ethical 
salience in the fi rst step protects one’s theory of religious accommoda-
tion from such counterarguments. But it also excludes the possibility 
that there can be reasons for accommodating a religious practice from 
happy religious enthusiasm that do not apply to people who prefer to 
ride a Harley down a deserted freeway bareheaded just for the sake of 
the special experience. In the next two sections, I show that, in some 
cases, we can fi nd compelling reasons to accommodate religious prac-
tices without establishing the ethical salience of the practices fi rst.
These compelling reasons, as I demonstrate in the next two sec-
tions, are sometimes related to religious individuals as members of re-
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ligious groups, and other times to how the environment interacts with 
the given religious preference. But this analysis that lays emphasis on 
the person-environment interaction can only be done if our theory is 
highly sensitive to context. What is surprising is that the disaggrega-
tion approach promises exactly such deep context-sensitivity, but its 
Labordian formulation fails to fully deliver. Instead of the rich descrip-
tions of empirical cases and their history, Laborde’s approach simply 
remains a close cousin to Maclure and Taylor’s conscience-based the-
ory. Hence, my second methodological criticism is that Laborde fails 
to take advantage of the full potential of the disaggregation approach.
Let me illuminate this methodological criticism. I agree with Eman-
uela Ceva that the main novelty of Laborde’s approach to religion is a 
methodological one, namely, her disaggregation approach, which aims 
to both identify the important values at play in the multiple contexts 
where religion is present and “unpack the religious phenomenon it-
self” (Ceva 2018: 819). This “unpacking” of religion as a method to me 
suggests, to use Jonathan Wolff ’s phrase, a “problem-driven” (bottom-
up) approach rather than a “theory-driven” (top-down) approach (Wolff 
2011). Wolff holds that with public policies, we should apply the prob-
lem-driven approach, which implies that “the fi rst task is to try to un-
derstand enough about the policy area to be able to comprehend why it 
generates moral diffi culties, and then to connect those diffi culties or di-
lemmas with patterns of philosophical reasoning and refl ection” (Wolff 
2011: 9). The problem-driven approach fi ts nicely with Laborde’s disag-
gregation approach—disaggregating religion as a phenomenon should 
be handled, I believe, by fi rst examining the kind of problem we are 
facing regarding a given religious practice, and understanding all the 
complexities of the situation. By contrast, Laborde’s theory of exemp-
tions seems top-down: she makes great efforts in the book to provide 
a theory that integrates all occurring and possibly emerging religious 
accommodation cases. That is, if we have an accommodation claim, we 
should try to think about how it would go through the fi lters of ethical 
salience (IPCs) and Laborde’s two principles of accommodation.
But given how complex and diverse the problem of religious accom-
modation is, I believe these integrative, top-down theories that aim to 
explain and justify all accommodation claims are doomed to fail. In-
stead, theorists should aim to provide partial, bottom-up explanations, 
or insights that focus on the problems on the ground. In other words, 
instead of trying to “paint the full picture”, theorists of religious accom-
modation should aim to provide partial theories without which the full 
picture of religious accommodation would be incomplete.4
4 Here I refer to Calabresi and Melamed’s famous work (Calabresi and Malamed 
1972). Calabresi and Malamed aim to provide a partial legal theory of property rules 
and torts, without offering a comprehensive theory of tort law. As they put it, “[a]s 
Professor Harry Wellington is fond of saying about many discussions of law, this 
article is meant to be only one of Monet’s paintings of the Cathedral at Rouen. To 
understand the Cathedral, one must see all of them” (Calabresi and Malamed 1972: 
1089n2).
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3.2 Laborde’s ethical salience is too individualistic
Laborde’s approach runs into further problems, which stem from one of 
the fundamental features of her formulation of ethical salience: it is pri-
marily individualistic. Laborde assumes that if there is something ethi-
cally salient about religious practices, it must be located at the level of 
a person. So, if we want to learn about the ethical salience of a practice, 
we must direct our focus onto the relationship between the person and 
her commitments. But this individualistic focus cannot always account 
for why we want to accommodate religious practices. Let me highlight 
three aspects of religious accommodation which render an individual-
istic approach unconvincing. First, consider Peter Jones’ point about 
‘innocent’ reasons for the special legal protection of religion:
Religions are more likely than non-religious beliefs to throw up norms of 
conduct that clash with prevailing socio-economic arrangements, such as 
holy days, religious festivals, dress codes, sacred symbols, prayer times, 
dietary requirements, and so on. It is diffi cult to imagine a non-religious 
system of belief generating a similar range of norms, unless it was itself 
quasi-religious. (Jones 2012: 1)
Jones’ observation highlights an important point, namely that religions 
can frequently be comprehensive in the sense that they regulate similar 
aspects of their followers’ lives as the state does for its citizens. I hold 
that the presence of this kind of comprehensiveness can give compel-
ling reasons for considering the accommodation of any religious prac-
tice that clashes with similar majority practices, without relying on the 
question of ethical salience. I think this non-individualistic perspec-
tive should have been on Laborde’s radar. In other words, her analysis 
should be sensitive to whether the burdens falling on the exercise of a 
given religious practice are intrinsic to that practice, or they are posi-
tional, in which case the burden is due to an environment where the 
practice clashes with majority arrangements.
Second, a further diffi culty is related to group-based religious and 
cultural accommodation. Laborde fails to recognize that numbers can 
matter, in terms of how many individuals seek accommodation. What 
certainly does not help Laborde here is her focus on providing exemp-
tions, which in many cases does not involve signifi cant cost-shifting. Of 
course, I do not want to suggest that she fails to consider the distribu-
tive aspects of religious accommodation entirely, since the last of the 
four components of her principle of disproportionate burden concerns 
cost-shifting. I also acknowledge that exempting certain practices from 
generally applicable laws is a problem for liberals.
But Laborde’s focus is somewhat narrow in that it detracts atten-
tion from the fact that accommodation often requires assistance to 
claimants, which can entail the modifi cation of the social and material 
environment. Frequently, for such reconstructive claims, idiosyncrasy 
is not enough to justify accommodation however ethically salient the 
claim might be. Of course, an immediate response from Laborde can 
be that the fi rst prong concerns only pro tanto reasons for accommoda-
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tion; whether the given (ethically salient) religious practice should be 
accommodated is a further question. An ethically salient idiosyncratic 
claim might not end up being eligible for exemption based on consider-
ations of distributive justice. But then again, the accommodation of any 
religious practice, even those that Laborde takes not to be ethically sa-
lient, might be justifi ed once there are enough people within a socially 
salient group who share the given practice.
Take Akiva Nof ’s case. During the Gulf War in 1990, the state of 
Israel provided gas masks to its citizens in order to protect them from 
possible gas attacks. Interestingly, the state manufactured special 
gas masks (which were twice as expensive) for its religious citizens 
who were bearded, since normal gas masks were useless for them (gas 
masks need to be airtight). But, Akiva Nof, a non-religious bearded 
citizen, also wanted a special gas mask for free, claiming that his beard 
was an essential part of his identity. He was denied, so his case ended 
up in Israeli Supreme Court, where he won.5 For the sake of the pres-
ent argument, let’s assume that Nof ’s motivation counts as an integrity 
protecting commitment (IPC), but the Orthodox Jews’ preference for 
beards does not (they merely grow beards for happy religious enthu-
siasm or adherence to synagogue fashion). Thus, a Labordian theory 
would only focus on the question whether Nof ’s ethically salient prac-
tice is worthy of accommodation, or not.
The diffi culty with Laborde’s individualistic integrity view in such a 
scenario is that it is counterintuitive. For if someone’s integrity is what 
makes a difference, then the special gas mask should not be manu-
factured in the fi rst place because the Orthodox Jews’ preference for 
beards is not ethically salient. Moreover, special masks would arguably 
not be manufactured for the sake of a single person,6 like Nof, however 
ethically salient his practice is.
In my view, it would be very counterintuitive to argue that designing 
and manufacturing a single special size mask, even if not very costly, is 
a requirement of justice. I believe it makes much more sense in this con-
text to hold that once a suffi ciently large group (having Labordian IPCs 
or not) carves out an accommodation, other persons who have a justifi -
able claim (possibly including conscientious objectors) can join that ac-
commodation. But an individual, ethically salient practice or preference 
alone does not have this accommodation prompting force. That is, the 
ethical salience of the individual identity-IPC in this case does not trig-
ger accommodation, unlike moral considerations from the group level. 
Or, if we want to stay loyal to the notion of ethical salience, in cases like 
those of the special gas masks, we can say that ethical salience of reli-
gion is generated by its group, not its individual dimension.
At this point, Laborde could object that if numbers matter in such 
a way, then we prove too much. The argument would suggest that any 
group, even with prima facie trivial characteristics, might be eligible 
5 I take this example from Perez (2009).
6 Here I assume the problem of the economies of scale.
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for accommodation, and it would not be obvious what is special about 
religion; that is, we end up with the unappealing position of dissolution. 
To reply to this worry, on the one hand, I do not fi nd it counterintuitive 
that even the most mundane characteristic/practice can be accommo-
dated if it is shared by enough people. Consider cyclists’ preference for 
more bike lanes. This preference is triggered by the fact that bikers in 
a neighborhood have reached “critical mass”. It would be unfair to deny 
this accommodation to them (while simultaneously provide it to people 
using alternative means of transport, e.g. car drivers).
On the other hand, this is not dissolution, at least not in the Dwor-
kinian sense. Dworkin builds on the same two-level assumption that 
characterizes Laborde’s theory: the fi rst step establishes the ethical 
salience of a religious practice, as a necessary but not suffi cient (pro 
tanto) reason for accommodation. If a given practice is not ethically 
salient then accommodation is not warranted; since the ethical salience 
of religion for Dworkin cannot be established as part of this fi rst step, 
accommodation is unjustifi ed. But my view is different. The ethical 
salience of a given practice is not necessary for justifying the accom-
modation—the reason for accommodation might stem from a different 
source.7 I also do not share Dworkin’s dissolution approach because I do 
consider certain religious practices ethically salient (including Labord-
ian IPCs), but I simply hold that building our theory of accommodation 
on ethically salient individual practices would be too narrow. In addi-
tion, I think that comprehensiveness and suffi cient numbers make reli-
gious groups special beyond the individual level of beliefs and practices 
and this can arguably justify accommodation.
Moreover, a third group-based reason for accommodation is social 
salience. According to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “a group is socially 
salient if perceived membership of it is important to the structure of 
social interactions across a wide range of social contexts” (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2013: 30). Unlike Laborde, I hold that this aspect of reli-
gious groups is important in the accommodations/exemptions context, 
since minority group membership and related religious practices can 
be subject to the majority’s discriminatory treatment, similarly to ra-
cial groups or the disabled. In my view, non-accommodation can some-
times expressively harm religious minorities, by sending a message to 
claimants that their practice is less valuable than that of the majority 
merely on the grounds of their group membership. Thus, accommoda-
tion might be justifi ed if it helps to prevent expressive harm to religious 
minorities. Laborde rejects this expressive-discrimination perspective 
in the context of exemptions/accommodations:
Consider […] freedom of speech. In most cases, religious convictions should 
be analogized to ideas and opinions open to public critique. But when the 
target of the speech is not the beliefs themselves but some prejudiced, libel-
7 This can be the mismatch between individual characteristics and environmental 
requirements as I emphasize in Section 2.3, where I draw the disability analogy.
 M. Zala, Laborde’s Liberalism’s Religion 65
ous, or offensive characteristic attributed to the group itself, we can talk 
of hate speech via the racialization of religion, and the second dimension 
of religion comes to the fore. In cases of exemptions, however, I have sug-
gested that the salient dimension of religion is neither “belief” nor “race.” It 
is, rather, what I have called integrity-protecting commitments. They are 
weightier than mere belief (which may or may not be connected to integ-
rity). And they are not an externally assigned, racelike identity: they are 
commitments that individuals positively identify with, which should not be 
construed as a disability or disadvantage. (Laborde 2017: 224)
But as I emphasize elsewhere, neglecting a socially salient group’s 
crucial characteristics in designing public arrangements amounts to 
negligence and is discriminatory (Zala 2018: 819). The wrong-making 
feature of this kind of negligence is exactly that it causes an expres-
sive harm to these groups, as in the case of racist policies. In the Sikh 
crash helmet case, as I demonstrate in my other work, this element 
of expressive harm is certainly present, arguably justifying the Sikhs’ 
exemption from wearing crash helmets on motorcycles (Zala 2017: 11), 
whereas an individualistic, integrity-based notion of accommodation is 
counterintuitive in this case.
One might think that the role of Laborde’s principle of majority 
bias is exactly to tackle these problems. After all, this principle deals 
with individuals as members of religious groups. But it is puzzling why 
Laborde does not entertain the idea of expressive harms if she thinks 
majority bias is a crucial problem regarding exemptions. Ideally, the 
principle of majority bias should counter tendencies of indirect reli-
gious discrimination, which should not only showcase the relevance of 
expressive harms, but also highlight why establishing ethical salience 
is unnecessary when minority religious practices are proxies for treat-
ing groups unfairly. It also points to a fundamental tension in Laborde’s 
theory between the two prongs simply because any, even the most triv-
ial religious practice, can be subject to majority bias. But if that is the 
case, then we do not have to treat ethical salience as a lexically prior 
entry requirement for accommodation. In the following section, I show 
that even the majority bias principle’s scope is too narrow because—as 
we will see regarding human variation issues—the need for minority 
accommodation does not always entail bias on the part of the majority.
3.3 Religion and disability
My fi nal critical remarks refer to Laborde’s dismissal of the analogy 
between religion and disability. Laborde’s discussion of this issue is 
sporadic and exclusively focuses on Eisgruber and Sager’s argument, 
although she is defi nitely not alone in rejecting this analogy (Barry 
2001: 36–7; Dworkin 2002: 291–6). Laborde’s view regarding disabili-
ties and the analogy between disability and religion is unsatisfactory 
in two respects.
First, her rejection of the analogy comes from a false understanding 
of why disability is a social problem. According to Laborde, “[i]t makes 
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a moral difference that people (by and large) positively endorse and em-
brace their religious convictions, whereas they (by and large) prefer not 
to suffer from a disability” (2017: 56). This characterization of disabil-
ity is often called the ‘personal tragedy view’ and underlies the ‘medical 
model’ of disability (Barnes 2016: 168). But the personal tragedy view 
is both offensive to people with physical impairments and misleadingly 
essentializes their situations. It is true that, for many people, losing 
an already possessed physical function is tragic and a circumstance 
of their lives that they would like to prevent from ever happening if 
they had the opportunity. This is especially true for those individuals 
whose life projects crucially depend on some physical characteristics 
and skills. Just think of a conductor who loses his hand in an accident 
(provided s/he does not possess the unique skills of Leonard Bernstein).
But this is not necessarily true for every person who is physically 
impaired. For those who were born with a functional limitation, this 
might not be a problem (that they should “overcome”) at all. This is 
because for many physically impaired people, their impairments are 
not, to use Ronald Dworkin’s distinction, limitations on but parameters 
for their lives and life plans (Dworkin 2002: 260). Laborde seems to 
acknowledge this when she says that
One may object […] that people may also embrace, and identify with, their 
state of pregnancy, age, or disability. This is correct, but it misses the point: 
there are separate reasons for accommodating such states of being or cycles 
of life. IPC exemptions, by contrast, arise principally out of a confl ict be-
tween the law and a given belief or project. An incidental burden on an 
IPC should be construed not as a disadvantage worthy of compensation but 
instead as one of the costs of (well-ordered) freedom. (Laborde 2017: 219)
Two things must be said regarding Laborde’s rejoinder. First, here 
again, she affi rms that what she has in mind is the medical model of 
disability, which holds that disability is a personal defi cit that must be 
corrected or compensated. A criticism can be raised that her view on 
disability is ableist, claiming implicitly that being able bodied is a norm 
that physically impaired people should live up to. The fi rst problem 
with her denial of the analogy between disability and religious accom-
modation is that it could only be true if ableism were correct.
But there is a further diffi culty with Laborde’s view: because of her 
inappropriate understanding of disability, she does not acknowledge 
the role of the environment in creating impediments for both disabled 
and religious individuals. Laborde, just as Eisgruber and Sager, con-
siders disability an individual characteristic. For Eisgruber and Sager, 
the analogy between disability and religion is intuitive, and they try to 
substantiate it by stating that for disabled individuals, their disability 
is a comparably “deep” and “serious” commitment or project (Eisgruber 
and Sager 2007: 101, 104; Laborde 2014b: 58). Laborde rightly rejects 
their reasoning because it is unnecessary for accommodating the dis-
abled that their physical impairments should have a special meaning 
to them. This individual focus is misleading because many of the diffi -
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culties the disabled face are results of unaccommodating environments.
In previous work, I show exactly how the environment creates im-
pediments for both religious minorities and the disabled. There, I apply 
the human variation model of disability (HVM) to the problem of reli-
gious accommodation. According to the HVM, disability is a problem of 
mismatch between personal characteristics and the environment (Was-
serman et al. 2016). According to the chief proponents of this model, 
Richard Scotch and Kay Schriner:
[D]isability could be defi ned as an extension of the variability in physical 
and mental attributes beyond the present—but not the potential—ability of 
social institutions to routinely respond[...] [T]he problems faced by people 
with disability might be seen as the consequence of the failure of social 
institutions (and their physical and cultural manifestations) that can be at-
tributed to the institutions’ having been constructed to deal with a narrower 
range of variation than is in fact present in any given population. (Scotch 
and Schriner 1997: 155; quoted in Zala 2018: 812)
In other words, the problem of the physically impaired is that they are 
an atypical minority, the social and physical arrangements of which 
are tailored to the characteristics of the majority. Thus, I approach the 
Sikh crash helmet case from a completely different angle than Laborde. 
The complication is not that Sikhs object to the general requirement of 
wearing a helmet, but that the British state failed to take into account 
in enacting the mandatory helmet regulation that there are citizens in 
the UK for whom wearing helmets on top of their turbans is not an op-
tion (cf. Poulter 1998: 292). This raises moral controversies because the 
negligence of the British state could potentially send the message that 
Sikhs are less important citizens than non-Sikhs.
Laborde could reply that her principle of majority bias can account 
for human variation cases. But this comes at a cost: to begin with, she 
has to acknowledge that Eisgruber and Sager’s mainstreaming strat-
egy often makes sense. Consequently, the principle of majority bias 
would have to be refi ned, as it should no longer be about whether there 
is fairness among the treatment of religious groups, but about fairness 
between mainstream society and a religious minority. Or, if we are 
suffi cientarians or capabilitarians, we do not even need a comparison 
group to justify reconstruction. We would hold that Sikhs must have 
the opportunity to ride motorcycles safely, independently of the fact 
that this opportunity is provided to others.
Consider the following example, involving the Japanese restroom 
experience of Irving Zola, a disability scholar and activist, who upon 
entering a public restroom in Japan was surprised to fi nd not only that 
the restroom had toilets for the disabled “with an expansiveness in size 
and features” he has “never encountered outside of a private home”, 
but that the restroom also had a full range of accommodating toilets 
for “normal” people (Zola 1993: 23). Thus, the restroom had both tra-
ditional Japanese toilets (where one squats over a “squat hole”) and 
Western style toilets (Zola 1993: 23). Zola was amazed because he real-
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ized he had been trapped in the dichotomous view of disability (accord-
ing to which someone is either disabled, or not). The amazing variation 
of different toilets from the Japanese experience made him recognize 
that disability is a gradual notion, a matter of degree (Zola 1993: 23–4).
Yet, the reason why this example is interesting to me is because it 
shows a number of important things about accommodation in general. 
It not only shows that modifying the environment can be required by 
reasons for accommodating the needs of religious, cultural and physi-
cally impaired people, but that it would also be offensive if the charac-
teristics of one of the socially salient groups were not considered during 
the design of the public restrooms.
We can also test Laborde’s IPCs with Zola’s example. First, the 
example shows that the need for accommodation depends neither on 
obligation-IPCs nor on identity-IPCs. Accommodation is triggered, I 
believe, because a lack thereof would send the message towards sa-
lient social groups, like the Japanese or the physically impaired, that 
the state does not consider them likely users of such public facilities 
(cf. Anderson 2010: 92). The moral assessment of this situation would 
not change if an additional religious group appeared requiring a new 
design for the toilet. Their preference for the special design of toilets 
would provide pro tanto reasons for accommodation even if it was nei-
ther an obligation, nor a matter of personal identity, but merely an 
ordinary, trivial reason.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I showed that Laborde’s theory of religious exemptions 
faces some important diffi culties. These are related to her formulation 
of the ethical salience of religious practices that provide reasons for ac-
commodating such practices exclusively. I pointed out that her empha-
ses on obligations and identity as the grounds of religious individuals’ 
integrity, which, in turn, serves as the backdrop for accommodation, 
faces some challenges. First, her formulation of the ethical salience of 
religious practices based on personal integrity is too narrow. Second, 
her individualistic understanding of ethical salience faces several prob-
lems. Finally, I aimed to show that her rejection of the analogy between 
religious and disability accommodation is unconvincing.
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